For decades prior to President Obama, the federal government invested only $4 billion to create a 437-mile High Speed Rail line in the Northeast Corridor (Washington-Baltimore-Wilmington-Philadelphia-Newark-NYC-New Haven-Providence-Boston). Meanwhile, less than $1 billion of federal funds were applied to the remaining 22,000 rail miles.

In January 2010, President Obama directed $8 billion from the $787 billion economic stimulus to intercity passenger rail corridors designated to achieve High Speed Rail (HSR) status. He also directed $5 billion to Amtrak over 5 years to address its maintenance backlog. By far, $13 billion is the largest federal funding of intercity passenger rail. His actions suggest a poetic bookend to President Lincoln who authorized construction of the transcontinental railroad amidst the Civil War. America’s first black President, whose mantra is “Change We Can Believe In“, began upgrading intercity passenger rail amidst two wars and a great recession. So what’s not to like?

22,000 MILES OF RAIL ROUTES — FINE FOR FREIGHT, BAD FOR HIGH SPEED

U.S. rail routes, to an overwhelming degree, are owned by freight train companies and to a lesser degree, by commuter transit agencies. By law, freight train companies and transit agencies lease tracks to Amtrak. Though more overpasses and underpasses separating rails from roads are welcome, higher speed is not required for freight trains or commuter trains. More importantly, leasing fees from Amtrak are relatively low. Hence, freight train companies and transit agencies have no incentive to upgrade routes for high speed travel, unless someone else picks up the tab.

It is common for Amtrak to top at 60 mph with lousy on-time performance and few daily trains. That partly explains why, excluding an 18-mile segment in Connecticut owned by Amtrak, passenger rail routes are plagued with any combination of Slow Zone factors:

• trains traveling in opposite directions sharing a single track
• curvy, bumpy tracks that can’t support high speeds
• antiquated trains, bridges, tunnels, electrical wires and signaling that can’t support high speeds
• too many places where autos, people and animals cross train tracks
• slow freight and commuter trains limiting the number of passenger trains per day

As distressing as these issues are for Amtrak, they are fine for freight trains and tolerable for commuter trains. Aware of these systemic issues, President Obama positioned his $13 billion as the kick-start to a comprehensive as the Interstate HSR System.

FUNDING INTERSTATE HIGHWAYS SHOULD BE THE TEMPLATE FOR INTERSTATE HIGH SPEED RAIL

President Eisenhower has the legacy of kick-starting our Interstate Highway System in 1955-56 and witnessing the commercial aviation switch from shorter distance turboprops to longer distance jets in 1958. Since then, the federal government has invested an inflation-adjusted $1.35 trillion for interstate highways. It has also invested an inflation-adjusted $450 billion in airports and air traffic control. As a result, our Interstate Highway System and Federal Aviation System helped vault America to global superpower while transforming our lifestyles, land-use and energy-use in ways unimaginable. Now we can’t imagine a great America without them.

From a cost-per-passenger perspective, many Interstate Highway projects in rural states were not cost-justifiable and some projects in states with large metro areas were gold-plated. Thus, spending $1.35 trillion of taxpayer money to build 50,000 miles of Interstate Highway required political vote-trading between states sustained over decades, regardless of political party.

Here’s an example. Many in Congress objected to an Interstate Highway project in Boston called the Big Dig. Since that uber-expensive project benefited drivers to Boston from other parts of Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New Hampshire, Vermont, Maine and Connecticut, there would be no problem getting congressional votes from the Northeast. Meanwhile Congresspersons in sparsely populated Idaho, Montana, New Mexico, Wyoming and Utah also needed congressional votes for their difficult-to-cost-justify Interstate Highway projects. Both sets of interest traded bi-partisan Congressional votes to win federal funding.

Using cost of the Interstate Highway System as a partial guide, we need an order of magnitude more than $13 billion to build an Interstate HSR System. Yet it seemed that stars were aligning to build it in earnest. Construction of the 1955 Interstate Highway System Plan completed in 1992. Even with additional beltways around our major cities, by any reasonable definition, the Interstate Highway Plan finished expansion in 2010. Though highways, bridges and tunnels always need maintenance, we can now focus on a new mode of transportation for 21st century — High Speed Rail for passengers.

Despite underinvestment, Amtrak’s Acela HSR route annually transports 11 million passengers — that’s more people than fly in the Northeast Corridor and at a profit. A collateral benefit of its popularity is that Acela has allowed Washington, Baltimore, Philadelphia, Newark, New York City and Boston international airports to allocate more gates and runway slots to flights outside the corridor, thereby limiting airport runway expansion.

Aware of that modest success story, many politicians and state Departments of Transportation (DOT) studied the benefits-to-costs of HSR systems in the Northeast Corridor, Europe and Asia. Thousands more rail miles can be upgraded to HSR routes at a cost far less than airport or Interstate Highway expansion. Having done that homework, most states containing corridors of large metro areas or in multi-state corridors of large metro areas want HSR. With so many freight-commuter-Amtrak routes needing upgrade and opportunity for job creation, Interstate HSR funding “should” be perfect for urban-rural, bi-partisan vote trading.

The 2008-09 Great Recession demanded that our federal government create economic recovery jobs. Economic prudence demanded that those jobs be well-planned. In the case of HSR, prudence means constructing routes of high national merit within a long term Interstate HSR vision.

In 2009, a large number of Democrat and Republican governors, mayors and a clear majority of congresspersons supported HSR projects that most economists and the Institute for Civil Engineers say we desperately need. The President agreed. Thus, he spread Interstate HSR projects around to states that submitted funding applications, just as we did for the Interstate Highway System. The timing seemed right and even the federal deficit didn’t seem too big a hurdle.

In FY2010, the federal government collected over $2 trillion in taxes. If we invested $10 billion per year, it would represent 1/2000th of America’s federal budget. Thus, spending $10 billion/year on HSR has no meaningful impact on the federal deficit and is significantly less than the $47 billion spent on Federal Highways and $16 billion spent on Federal Aviation per year. That $10 billion/year spent on Interstate HSR would create nearly half a million jobs.

Unfortunately, vote trading for Interstate HSR is harder to come by due to a change of public sentiment and powerful forces undermining its progress for decades.

HIGH SPEED RAIL CONSTRAINED BY AMERICANS LOVE AFFAIR WITH HIGHWAYS AND FOUR INDUSTRIES

America had a thriving train culture prior to the 1950s. Then in our quest for personal freedom to drive faster and stop when we wanted between cities, we dramatically increased our use of national highways. Songs like Route 66 mythologized the joy of driving one of America’s most scenic national highways. No one wrote songs about the wonderful California Zephyr train passing through scenic mountain canyons. Then it really got worse for passenger trains. In 1956, Interstate Highway System construction began. As each Interstate Highway segment completed featuring speeds of 75-80 mph, it expanded Americans’ sense of personal freedom unfettered by the road crossings and traffic lights of national highways. People enjoyed driving non-stop for 2 to 4 hours. Given American love affair with cars and Interstate Highways, each states added their own “freeways” interconnected to the Interstate Highway System.

In 1958, the Commercial Jet Age began when pressurized passenger jets flew higher for a smoother, faster ride than the turboprop planes they replaced. Business travelers chose flights to save time over longer distances. Even though they subsidized driving and flying, citizens felt comfortable with their tax dollar building the Interstate Highway System and international airports because they created local jobs too.

Unlike Japan, France, Italy and Germany in the 1960s-70s, our political leaders did not consider investments to speed up intercity passenger trains. So passenger demand for our trains and stations withered by 1962. Passenger train companies either went out of business, shuttered their passenger service or sold their rail routes to freight train companies. Though Congress put intercity passenger trains on life-support by forming Amtrak in 1971, most of America didn’t care.

Then OPEC’s second oil embargo to America hit in 1979. In quick response, President Carter and several members of Congress raised the subject faster electric-powered intercity trains and rail transit. By then, powerful lobbies had formed representing auto, airline, oil and freight rail industries who wanted to increase highway funding, expand regional flights, increase oil consumption and prevent/limit regulation and track sharing of freight rail routes.

After the second oil embargo, interests representing the four industries engaged think tanks to mislead news media about the benefits of including electric-powered “Green Transportation” in our mix of transportation modes. Using analyst reports from hired think tanks, they increased lobbying to state and federal officials to frown upon electric-powered rail transit and high-speed passenger trains in order to invest more transportation dollars on highways and airports. Their efforts were sufficient to delay a large number of Rail Transit projects, but they have been most effective influencing Congress and Presidents to defer building an Interstate HSR System.

When you click on the High-Speed Intercity Passenger Rail Program map to see a larger version of our investment, ask yourself why glaring gaps remain in so many high population corridors. There is no HSR connection between the heavily populated Northeast and Midwest. The current HSR program stops in Charlotte, rather than down to the larger destinations of Atlanta, Orlando and Miami. Fast growing Texas and Arizona did not apply for construction funding in 2009. The map looks provincial, not national. Is that why its called “Intercity” rather than “Interstate”?

Fortunately, momentum has shifted towards Green Transportation in two industries and compromise in another. Unfortunately, the other industry, plus one new opponent have have dug in against Green Transportation.

TWO INDUSTRIES REMAIN HIGH SPEED RAIL ENEMIES

President Obama increased MPG requirements for all autos and used economic stimulus to kick-start more private investment in battery technology. When Obama bailed out GM and Chrysler, he stipulated that electric-hybrid cars be a larger part of their future. With intense green competition from Toyota, Honda and VW, and demand increasing for electric-hybrids, Ford was nudged to do the same. In this manner, the close-knit relationship between oil and auto industries producing more gas-guzzlers has finally been fractured. We are headed towards more hybrid-electric vehicles in all models that will get 50 MPG next decade.

Airlines have recently gone green too. After labor costs, oil-based jet fuel is their second largest operating expense. Thus, airlines eagerly await next generation jets designed for greater fuel efficiency, advancements to make jet biofuel less expensive and the next generation Air Traffic Control System to shorten flight delays.

Airlines have another motivation. Suburban sprawl has enveloped our international airports. So for noise and air pollution reasons, most surrounding communities don’t want international airports expanded. Furthermore, as air traffic increases due to population growth, runway slots are becoming more scarce. Understandably, major airlines are allocating more of their slots for longer distance flights that generate higher profits. Hence, United-Continental, American, Delta and US Airways now welcome partnership with Amtrak to offload short regional travel. Thus far however, only the Northeast Corridor has convenient airport-to-Amtrak connections. Given so much of its business consists of regional flights, Southwest has remained publicly neutral to towards Amtrak-HSR partnership.

Bigger competition with Freight Trucking is pushing Freight Rail towards compromise with HSR. In return for sharing more routes with HSR, Freight Rail industry wants more bottlenecks and safety hazards removed via more overpasses, safer road crossings, upgraded tracks, new bridges and upgraded tunnels paid for by the USDOT (taxpayer money). In 2012, we see tangible evidence of this compromise in Midwest, Northeast, Mid-Atlantic, Pacific Northwest and California routes owned by freight rail companies, being upgraded for faster Amtrak service. Its now clear that reducing freight rail shipping cost is intertwined with improving commuter rail and intercity passenger rail.

Through better safety regulation than his predecessor, President Obama is permitting more drilling for America’s vast natural gas reserves, a boon to oil companies who own the most lease rights to drill. But he also wants to eliminate oil company subsidies, another round of auto MPG increases, more Rapid Transit and HSR that reduce oil consumption. That angers oil companies.

Obama also attracted a new Green Transportation enemy. It happened on the 2008 Campaign trail when Obama announced a plan to kick-start larger private investment in Green Energy (biofuel, wind, solar, tidal and geothermal) to generate electricity. Electric-powered HSR and Rail Transit would eventually take advantage of Green Energy that reduces demand for coal used to generate electricity. That angers coal companies.

I reveal more insights about oil and coal industry antipathy towards Green Transportation in Part 4 of this article.

AMERICA IGNORED HIGH SPEED RAIL LESSONS FROM FRANCE

Japan is a great example of commitment to HSR by a market-economy nation with strong private land and labor rights. But its super-dense population on an island nation is too dissimilar from America to use as a model for why and how we should build Interstate HSR. France however, is similar to the Northeast in population density, terrain, market economy with strong private land and labor rights.

Within and circling big cities, France has freeways. Outside big cities Autoroute, an 81 mph (130 kmph) 4- to 6-lane tollway system, blankets a country the size of Texas. With gasoline in France far more expensive than in America, Paris and Lyon built extensive transit systems feeding train stations. Moreover, France added many overpasses for intercity passenger trains to reach 112-131 mph (180-210 kmph) without stopping for autos. Those speeds kept trains relevant and public opinion supportive of the French government envisioning higher speed trains to compliment its Autoroute and national aviation system.

In 1976, France began constructing High-Speed-Only tracks called “LGV” (Line à Grande Vitesse) for “TGV” (Train à Grande Vitesse) trains. Initially, there were concerns about LGV and TGV construction costs equivalent to $2.7 billion. Then in 1981, TGV debuted at 168 mph (270 km/h) on the LGV line. Commuters quickly realized that TGV shrank the 264-mile Paris-Lyon trip time shorter than flying plus ground transport to city center — TGV became an instant hit. In 1988, TGV engines were enhanced to support 186 mph (300 kmph) and TGV service reached 97% on-time performance that wiped out air travel and prevented demand to widen Autoroute between France’s two largest cities.

For similar reasons, the United Kingdom and Belgium joined France developing 186 mph LGV and a channel tunnel for Eurostar train service that has nearly wiped out air travel between Paris, London and Brussels. With more expansion and reaching 199 mph (320 kmph) on two new LGVs, the 2000-mile TGV system in a country of 65 million people transports 114 million annual passengers. That’s equivalent to the combined passenger capacity of LAX and JFK airports. Electricity for the TGV and Rail Transit in France comes from nuclear power plants, so France imports far less oil per person than America and conserves its airport runway and gate capacity for longer flights. France also discovered that LGVs repay their construction costs in roughly 15 years. Afterwards, LGVs remain very profitable. That’s why private companies compete to cover 25-40% of new LGV expansion costs to run their TGV-standard trains on them.

By 2025, most remaining 112-131 mph (thin) corridors on the map below will transform into 186-224 mph (thick) LGV routes from France to Belgium, United Kingdom, Germany, Spain, Italy and Switzerland. Don’t be surprised when the 4000-mile TGV passes 200 million annual passengers. Aside from using more transit in big cities, tourists also rent more cars near TGV stations for scenic drives in the French countryside. French towns close to TGV stations are welcoming far more tourism than before TGV.

Obama was not the first American President to promote HSR. Seeking fast HSR benefits 16 years before President Obama, President Clinton used economic stimulus funds to kick-start a single HSR line in 1993. He chose Amtrak’s 437-mile Washington-NYC-Boston route in our most densely populated and transit-friendly corridor. For reasons unclear, Clinton and his Secretary of Transportation made three critical mistakes.

First, they approved nearly $1 billion in MagLev train studies, despite MagLev technology not being used in commercial operation (more below) in the two nations pioneering MagLev research & development. That huge mistake distracted the President from setting a vision focused on commercially proven HSR technology that Congress could support in three confidence-building steps. Second, instead of allocating $1 billion/4 years of economic stimulus funds for the entire 437-mile Washington-Baltimore-Philadelphia-Newark-NYC-New Haven-Providence-Boston corridor, they should have allocated $2 billion/2 years in the first step for High-Speed-Only track and bridge upgrades on the 97-mile Philadelpha-Newark-NYC segment, which at the time was America’s 1st and 4th highest population business centers. Third, in 1995 Clinton should have negotiated with Congress for $4 billion/6 years of regular transportation funds in the second confidence-building step. That amount would have attracted $1 billion of state & local investment to complete High-Speed-Only tracks, bridges and tunnels for the 129-mile Philadelphia-Baltimore-Washington segment. Hence, the completed 226-mile NYC-Washington segment enabling 185 mph top speed and 1 hour 55 minute trip time would have captured the public’s imagination and generated significantly larger profits than Acela today.

By year 2000, that positive media buzz would have made it fiscally sound and politically viable for Congress and Clinton to approve a $12 billion/8 year upgrade to the NYC-New-Haven-Providence-Boston segment as the third step. Given the upgraded NYC-Washington segment would generate over $2 billion in operating profit, the public could envision HSR investment as similar to new convention centers that are expensive to build, yet generate major profits once in operation. Even anti-train G.W. Bush would have been unable to stop that momentum. By 2009, that completed Acela upgrade would have enabled a 2 hour 30 minute trip time in the 211-mile Boston-NYC segment. With 95% on-time performance, more frequent trains and pricing at 80-90% the cost of flying, Acela Northeast Corridor would already be drawing 35 million annual passengers. For $19 billion of federal, state and local investment, that corridor would now be spinning off large profits and attracting private investment in future HSR routes, like TGV does in France.

Sensing a threat and exploiting Clinton’s mistakes, anti-HSR forces stepped up their use of think tanks to stymy rational discussion about HSR benefits. That led to funding delay for the Northeast Corridor when materials, labor and land were much cheaper.

MAGLEV DISTRACTION AND USING AMTRAK AS A WHIPPING BOY ADDED DELAY

In America, Japan and Europe, 280-300 mph MagLev trains would cost 2 times more than 200 mph HSR, but fall well short of twice the benefits. High speed MagLev trains in commercial operation only makes economic sense between two mega-business centers of relatively short distance apart or for a non-democratic nation that exercises land and labor rights over its citizens for drastically lower costs.

The hyper-dense population of Japan is the only democratic nation that meets such criteria. Tokyo (25M pop.) located 272 miles from Osaka (18M pop.), is theoretically, the only corridor capable of attracting enough business patrons willing to pay a premium for a 67-minute MagLev trip time vs. 2 hour HSR trip time. Yet even Japan won’t expand its MagLev test track into a commercially operating Tokyo-Osaka line until its national HSR network completes in 2020.

Germany, the other MagLev pioneer, has twice the population density of America’s Northeast Corridor. Yet that democratic nation could not justify the commercial benefits-to-cost of MagLev vs. HSR. That is why Germany licensed its MagLev technology at a huge discount to China, where government has stronger imminent domain land rights, as well as labor and material costs well below those of democratic nations. Shortly after license to China took affect, Germany scrapped MagLev plans at home and began expanding its HSR mileage like France.

For more details about the comparative benefits-to-costs of HSR and MagLev, read Intercity/Interstate Passenger Rail Taxonomy.

In the early 1990s, Japan and Germany both sales-pitched MagLev to the USDOT as “commercially-ready.” Instead of backing off because neither country built commercially operating lines at home, USDOT may have been blinded by the technological prowess of MagLev. Whatever the reason, USDOT gave its blessing to expensive MagLev for America study plans to President Clinton and Congress, who directed $1 billion of funds towards Magnetic Levitation train studies.

Despite underinvestment, Acela HSR has been “the little train that could.” By 2004, Acela was showing patronage improvement and modest profits. Modest success however, did not prevent President George W. Bush from trying to kill Amtrak. Fortunately, a cross-section of Congress backed by governors saved it. Under Bush however, Amtrak progress came to a near standstill.

Since President Obama kick-started Interstate HSR, even former critics acknowledge that Acela in the Northeast Corridor merits investment to become an Express HSR route. Unfortunately, it is now estimated to cost $52 billion. No one wants to mention that underfunding mistakes by Clinton, Congress, MagLev distraction, plus Bush using Amtrak as a whipping boy adds a $33 billion Cost of Delay: $52B – $19B = $33B.

THE COST OF DELAY, AGAIN

Here’s another potential Cost of Delay example. A Washington Post columnist attacked California HSR project for starting in mid-state farmland, then extending to Fresno and Bakersfield. He equates it to “Alaska’s Bridge to No Where.” The Washington Post has published many of articles of great service to the nation, but too many omissions make this article a shameful disservice to readers.

First, the article overlooked that the 800-mile California HSR alignment is using the same construction start approach as the Interstate Highway System, which began in Kansas and Missouri cornfields for a faster construction timetable, then built in each direction towards large cities. It did not mention that airlines have been cutting Los Angeles and San Francisco Bay Area service to the Central Valley because the sub-400-mile flight economics no longer fit their business models. Furthermore, due to space constraints and public outcry, 7 of California’s 9 largest airports, including LAX and SFO, can not add runways. In California, most airlines prefer that scarce runway slots be used for more profitable longer flights.

California already has the nation’s worst transportation-related smog and California’s two north-south freeways through the Central Valley are frequently congested. The U.S. Census Bureau forecasts that Sacramento, Fresno, Bakersfield, Stockton, Merced and Modesto in the Central Valley will add 10 million people by 2030. So the only alternative to the California HSR is carving another 6 lane freeway through steep mountain passes for more traffic congestion, smog and accidents between Los Angeles, San Francisco Bay Area and Sacramento. Lastly, by using wind and solar energy to generate electricity for the HSR system, California can significantly reduce its smog and oil consumption. All the difference-making points listed above were overlooked by the columnist.

When evaluating options to address its long term transportation, energy, environment and health challenges, the California DOT under both Democratic and Republican governors clearly understood that a “No Transportation Build Option” does not exist. Instead, the two Transportation Build Options are as clear, as they are diametrically opposite:

A. Spend less taxpayer funds and attract private investment to take 2 lanes of land that divert super-highway traffic growth to HSR thereby, REDUCING foreign oil consumption, smog and traffic accidents.

B. Spend more taxpayer funds without private investment carving mountain sides and acquiring more land for 6 more super-highway lanes, thereby INCREASING foreign oil consumption, smog and traffic accidents.

Even in the state most dominated with auto culture, the Los Angeles Times, San Francisco Chronicle, San Jose Mercury, Sacramento Bee and San Diego Union newspapers and state voters carefully weighed those two options. They endorsed and Californians voted for the HSR Build Option in a $9.9 billion bond measure in 2008.

These difference-making omissions by the columnist concerning HSR are common to news media nationwide. Their sound-bite HSR coverage confounds more than it illuminates. Worst of all, confusion breeds falsehoods. Falsehoods breed construction delay. Each year of delay inflates costs by billions of dollars.

SUMMARY OF PRO-HSR AND CON-HSR POSITIONS BY THINK TANKS

Despite slow construction progress, a combination of Amtrak, Federal Railroad, Federal Transit and state transportation funds are improving Northeast Corridor and Midwest HSR. I’ve also summarized reasons to build California HSR System. But I haven’t explained why America should build an Interstate HSR System or its likely costs. Before I do, consider pro-HSR and con-HSR positions summarized by think tanks framing the public debate.

When news media present anti-HSR positions, they frequently cite Heritage Foundation, Cato Institute and Reason Foundation critiques such as these:

• Excluding the Northeast Corridor, America doesn’t have enough population density to justify HSR
• Private companies don’t build HSR routes because there is no demand for it in auto-centric America
• HSR lines are taxpayer boondoggles that never pay off
• HSR doesn’t reduce air pollution or traffic congestion like freeway and airport expansion
• HSR advocates propose some routes that don’t make sense from a patronage perspective
• HSR trains can’t run over 200 mph to meet patron forecasts by California or Midwest HSR Authorities
• HSR routes should not be built until lots of Rapid Transit can feed it patrons
• Route upgrades to 60, 79 and 90 mph top speed being misrepresented as Emerging HSR Corridors
• Amtrak should have competition
• Amtrak has too many low patronage, unprofitable routes
• If a HSR route is worth building, it should attract significant private investment

On the pro-HSR side, some news media cite Brookings Institution, America 2050 and Transportation For America who remind us that we need an Interstate HSR System for these compelling reasons:

• America’s population in regional corridors containing large metro areas is exploding
• It less expensive to build and maintain HSR routes than highway lane additions and new airport runways
• HSR saves foreign oil consumption
• HSR routes reduce highway and airport traffic congestion
• HSR routes reduce air pollution and CO2 emissions
• The latest HSR trains are capable of exceeding 200 mph for more patronage
• More Rapid Transit coming to metro areas will feed patrons to HSR trains
• Passenger rail routes incrementally upgraded to HSR routes can also become profitable
• Interstate HSR will create several million domestic HSR jobs
• For global economic competition reasons we also need an Interstate HSR System

Are some arguments valid, whether pro or con? Which side is most right? PBS presents one of the better news media videos giving a balanced perspective about HSR.

LEADING AND EMERGING NATIONS RAPIDLY BUILDING HSR AS STRATEGIC INFRASTRUCTURE

In addition to the French and Japanese, a lot of smart people worldwide have studied the same HSR pros and cons. Yet every other leading and emerging nation is racing to complete comprehensive Intercity HSR systems that connect to a larger network, even amidst global recession.

China, South Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam, Indonesia, Singapore, Belgium, Netherlands, Spain, United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, Switzerland, Austria, Portugal, Denmark, Sweden, Poland, Czech Republic, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, South Africa, Turkey, India, Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela are investing single, double, and triple-digit billions of dollars. Those investing single-digit billions are spending a higher percentage of annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on HSR than America, in one case as high as 8% of GDP.

Given the huge financial investment, it takes more than a joy ride on the French TGV or Japanese Shinkansen to win over so many minds and wallets. Bigger motivations are driving nations to complete comprehensive Intercity HSR systems in 2020-30. I address those motivations in the next two parts of this article.

Tags: America High Speed Rail, fast trains, French TGV, High Speed Rail, HSR, Interstate High Speed Rail, Interstate HSR Network, Support High Speed Rail